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As we approach the beginning of the next century, it seems clear that the
United States has the economic capacity not only to compete effectively in the
new global economy, but to lead that economy in a direction that will promote
freer markets, reduce conflict, and improve living standards for people world-
wide. It is less clear, however, that the United States has the long-term political
will needed to provide and sustain the leadership required to do this.
Since its founding nearly 60 years ago, the Committee for Economic
Development has worked extensively in the areas of international trade, finance,
and investment. As part of this ongoing program, we are pleased to publish 
The Challenge to Lead: U.S. Global Economic Responsibilities in the 21st Century by
eminent international scholar, journalist, and CED advisor Bruce Stokes, who is
a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a columnist for the
National Journal.
This comprehensive volume provides a broad overview of the current issues
in international trade and finance that face the United States. While the views
are those of the author and not necessarily those of CED’s Board of Trustees or
professional staff, we believe The Challenge to Lead will help CED and others
think through some of the difficult policy issues facing business, government,
and international institutions in the coming years. We are proud to publish this
important work.
Charles E. M. Kolb 
President
Committee for Economic Development
Foreword
Introduction
The fate of the American economy is now closely tied to the world mar-
ketplace. Never have Americans been able to consume so much from abroad
(whether the latest high-quality VCR or computer) or sold so much to foreigners
(from passenger jets to mutual funds). Never before have so much economic
activity in the United States and so many jobs been dependent on exports. Not
in recent history have interest rates in America benefited so much from the
influx of foreign capital, making cars and homes more affordable. 
And rarely have American jobs and the U.S. financial system been so vulner-
able to rapid changes in the global economy. What started out in 1997 as a bank-
ing collapse in Thailand eventually brought down many of the economies of
East Asia and infected Russia and Latin America. The downturn, initially pro-
pelled by fundamental changes in financial markets, spread to the real econo-
my—to shopkeepers in Japan and steel makers in the United States—and threat-
ened the prosperity so newly won through international market integration. 
By early 1999 the sense of crisis was easing. Korea and Thailand seemed to
be recovering. The Brazilian economy, which had threatened to collapse, was
holding together, and the Russian contagion appeared contained. But serious
systemic problems remained. Japan was headed for its third year of recession.
The Chinese economy appeared fragile. And Europe’s economy was slowing. 
These challenges past and present pose new threats to America’s ability to
lead in the international economic arena. This task is complicated by the fact
that deep systemic changes in the global economy are now occurring that will
make this work harder. The volume and complexity of international capital
transactions will increasingly tax government’s regulatory capacity. New mar-
kets, in and out of cyberspace, test government’s ability to devise new rules of
the road for trade, investment, and taxation. New actors—a European Union
united with a common currency and China—and the sudden weakness of oth-
ers, especially Japan and some of the newly industrial states of Asia, complicate
efforts to build leadership coalitions and international consensus.  American tax-
payers are resisting the financial burden of leadership, and the international
institutions created at the dawn of the post-war international economy have
been overtaken by events and may be in need of reform.
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Only the United States can rally other nations to join in the revival of the
global economy, the restructuring of the international financial institutions, the
definition of a new regulatory framework for the global financial system, the fur-
ther liberalization of world trade, and the building of a new consensus on the
future direction of the world economy. 
The need for such recommitment is clear. Events since 1997 suggest that the
status quo is not sustainable. The global financial crisis was a wake up call, a
painful reminder that the world economy is changing and that the attitudes of
government leaders, businesses, and average citizens need to change too. The
United States, and the world, can no longer depend upon old policy tools, old
institutional structures, and an outdated vision of the future to deal with the
problems and to realize the opportunities of an increasingly global and borderless
economy. 
America needs to respond to these challenges with the same sense of urgency
that inspired creation of the post-war system two generations ago. 
The stakes are high. Before the Asian financial crisis hit, one-third of U.S. eco-
nomic growth and 12 million relatively high-paying American jobs depended on
exports.1 The performance of our financial markets increasingly depends on
growth in emerging markets and the international performance of U.S. firms. 
The task is formidable. In response to the immediate crisis, the United States
needs to mobilize international efforts to avoid a global recession by taking the
initiative in alleviating the overwhelming burden of indebtedness in emerging
markets. For the long term, America must lead the effort to revive flows of long-
term capital for emerging markets, steer the international debate on regulating
international short-term capital flows, be the primary architect of any reform of
the international financial institutions, and help craft safeguards that ensure that
the liberalization of capital markets does not outpace the regulatory capacity of
individual nations.
Since trade and foreign investment stimulate growth, the United States needs
to redouble the effort to broaden and deepen market liberalization. This will fur-
ther expand trade in agriculture and services, remove regulatory barriers to com-
merce and direct investment, and shape the agenda for the new multilateral
round of trade talks. And a way must be found to integrate China and Russia
into the world trading system. 
To succeed in these efforts, the United States needs the authority and
resources to lead, a coherent strategy to achieve its goals, and the help of like-
minded allies.  
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Developing a domestic and international consensus on the shape and
nature of a new global economy will require vision and sustained commitment.
It will also require a willingness to listen as well as preach (both to our allies
and to our own people) and a judicious and restrained exercise of U.S. power. 
The challenge is daunting. But the rewards are great. And the cost of failure
is unacceptable.
The U.S. Stake
Two generations ago, at the dawn of the second half of the 20th Century,
America had a relatively self-contained, continental economy. All that really
mattered economically to most Americans happened between the Atlantic
breakers on the east coast and the Pacific surf on the west. The trade and invest-
ment that flowed across those oceans was of little material importance, for better
or worse, to the daily lives of average Americans.
Today, on the eve of the 21st Century, the United States is a global economy.
The livelihoods and the economic futures of an unprecedented number of
Americans, their children, and grandchildren are now wholly or in part depen-
dent upon imports, exports, and the two-way flow of international investment.
This transformation has forever changed America’s stake in the world economy
and boosted the premium on U.S. leadership in global economic affairs.
By Almost Every Measure
By almost every measure—trade, direct foreign investment, equity purchas-
es, bank lending and even governmental borrowing—the globalization of the
American economy has advanced with remarkable speed. 
In 1975, the sale of U.S. bonds and equities to foreigners and the purchase of
foreign bonds and stocks by Americans measured only 4 percent of U.S. GDP.
By 1997, this measure of U.S. participation in world capital markets had risen to
213 percent of U.S. GDP.2
In the last 15 years, foreign direct investment in the United States grew five-
fold. As a result, 5 percent of the labor force now work for firms that are wholly
or partially foreign owned.3
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During the same period, direct investment abroad by American businesses
grew four-fold. Moreover, while the United States used to account for less than
one-fifth of global foreign direct investment outflows, it now accounts for nearly
one-third. And more and more Americans have sought higher returns on their
money by increasing their foreign portfolios. While in 1975 only one percent of
equities held by American investors was foreign, by 1996 that portion had
grown to 10 percent.4
Between 1970 and 1994, U.S. imports and exports rose from 11 percent of
GDP to 24 percent, a 118 percent increase. During the same period, this measure
of openness rose by only 43 percent in France and 24 percent in Germany, while
it actually fell by 17 percent in Japan. When the tariff cuts mandated by the
Uruguay Round are fully implemented, U.S. import duties will be lower than
those in Japan or Europe. The American economy is now among the most open
to international competition of the major industrial nations.5
The Changing Nature and Benefits of Integration
These broad numbers fail to capture the changing nature of the U.S. econo-
my in its deepening interaction with the world. While the United States contin-
ues to export impressive quantities of manufactured goods like aircraft, chemi-
cals, and machinery, our clear competitive advantage is in services such as bank-
ing, consulting, accounting, travel, and education. The United States ran a $79
billion services surplus in 1998, and this surplus has become increasingly impor-
tant. In 1987, for example, at the peak of that decade’s trade imbalance, the ser-
vices surplus offset only five percent of the deficit in goods. In 1998, the positive
balance in services offset 32 percent of the goods deficit.6
The consequences for the American economy of this exposure to global
competition have been revolutionary. Facing well-built, efficiently produced,
and thus competitively priced Japanese-built cars in the marketplace, between
1989 and 1994 the Big Three cut the number of man-hours needed to build a car
by 17 percent and design and production time for a new model by 15 percent.
Similar improvements have been experienced by American firms venturing into
the world marketplace. Productivity is now almost 40 percent higher on average
in American plants that export a range of goods than in plants that produce
only for the domestic market.7
Globalization has also provided individual working Americans with more
jobs, better wages, and greater employment stability. Export-related employ-
ment in the United States accounted for 23 percent of new private industry job
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growth in the first half of the 1990s; over the last decade, jobs supported by
exports rose four times faster than overall private-industry jobs. Furthermore,
both production and non-production workers at exporting plants receive 14 per-
cent higher pay and one-third more benefits than workers employed by similar
firms that do not export. Finally, plants that export are less likely to go out of
business, cushioning workers from the ups and downs of the domestic business
cycle.8
Americans also benefit as consumers in the global marketplace. Low-priced
shirts from the Philippines, toys from China, and other products from develop-
ing countries stretch the buying power of the paychecks of American workers
by an estimated 3 percent.9
The Costs of Globalization
America’s transition from a continental to a global economy, however, has
at times been painful. In the 1980s, the workers in individual industries con-
fronting international competition paid a heavy price. Hundreds of thousands of
workers permanently lost their jobs—many of them high paying—in the auto,
steel, textile, and apparel industries. Others lost their jobs because of the North
American Free Trade Agreement and the Uruguay Round multilateral trade
agreement.  In the early 1990s, before the recent dramatic fall in unemployment,
20 percent of American manufacturing workers displaced by trade took more
than a year to find a new job, and those who succeeded took, on average, a 10
percent pay cut. Workers who had health care coverage in their old job faced a
one in four chance of losing that benefit in a new position.10
While most of these people found work again during the full-employment
economy of the late 1990s, it is little wonder they have questions about the bene-
fits of globalization. And their experience is a reminder of the serious political
and social problems likely to attend further integration of the U.S. economy
with that of the world.
The Premium on Leadership
The stake that American investors, both small and large, U.S. manufacturers
and service providers and their workers, and American consumers have in the
international economy has never been greater. Driven by the force of technologi-
cal innovation and capital mobility, the globalization of the American economy
is irreversible. At the same time, the price of globalization, paid for by individ-
ual workers and their industries and communities, has at times been high. For
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these reasons, it is essential that the United States engage in the management
and direction of the global economy in order to maximize the benefits and mini-
mize the costs of further internationalization of the U.S. economy.
Reforming Global Finance
The global financial crisis that engulfed the world in the late 1990s
demonstrated the interdependence of the international economic system. Not
since the 1930s has the world faced such a pervasive threat of financial implo-
sion, business stagnation, and worldwide deflation. The crisis challenged the
nature and the structure of world capital markets in the 21st century. Although
the crisis is far from over, some of its lessons are already clear. Global financial
stability is a public good worth defending. Markets alone cannot be relied upon
to solve the problems that arise in a timely and politically acceptable fashion.
The United States is the only country capable of mobilizing others in a concerted
effort to deal with the immediate crisis and to manage the adaptation of the
international financial system in preparation for the future.
The financial turbulence that began in Thailand turned out to be a bit more
serious than President Bill Clinton’s initial characterization as “small glitches in
the road.” Most economists expected the Asian tumult to follow the pattern of
the 1995 Mexican peso crisis, with a sharp downturn followed by an equally
sharp recovery. In fact, the downturn was even deeper and far more prolonged.
By the autumn of 1998, East Asian stock markets had fallen 30-60 percent, and
currencies had weakened by 30-70 percent from early 1997. In 1998, the
Indonesian economy shrank by 15 percent, the Thai economy by 8 percent and
the Korean economy by 7 percent. By early 1999, stock markets and currencies
in the affected countries had recovered somewhat and Korea and Thailand were
growing again. But the Indonesian economy was still shrinking, and economic
activity in the region as a whole was still sluggish. As of May 1999, the IMF is
forecasting for the year 2000, economic growth of 4.6 percent in Korea, 3 percent
in Thailand, and 2.5 percent in Indonesia — far below the growth rates of the
early 1990s, but recovery nontheless.11
As if 1997 was not bad enough, the Asian flu spread to Russia in mid-1998,
as foreign investors fled emerging markets. This capital flight, in combination
with chronic Russian economic mismanagement and a crippling falloff in oil
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revenues, led Moscow to default on its domestic debt. This event spooked
investors all over the world, triggering a flight both to quality investments, such
as U.S. Treasury securities, and into short-term investments. Global stock mar-
kets lost more than $2 trillion in value.
The gyrations of the market hit leveraged investors, including both hedge
funds and banks, particularly hard. They found themselves overextended in los-
ing positions and were forced to sell their assets into very thin markets at dis-
tressed prices. The near bankruptcy of one of the world’s largest hedge funds,
Long Term Capital Management, was only the first in a number of threatened
failures, further intensifying this risk aversion.
This global financial turmoil had devastating effects on economic prospects.
In October 1997, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had forecast global
growth of 4.3 percent for 1998, whereas actual growth was only 2.5 percent. By
April 1999, the IMF was estimating only 2.3 percent expansion for 1999, the
slowest growth since 1991.
The causes of the global economic crisis were manifold. In the early 1990s
the world was awash in capital, with too much money chasing too few good
investment opportunities. Thanks to low inflation, the cutback in the govern-
ment deficit, and the growth of institutionalized savings through retirement sys-
tems, a huge pool of investment capital had become available in the United
States. At the same time, a reduction in government spending in Japan, coupled
with a dramatic rise in personal savings, created an even larger fund of avail-
able Japanese capital. New financial tools—derivatives, hedge funds, sophisti-
cated computer techniques—allowed that capital to be leveraged as never
before. High rates of return in emerging markets and near zero rates of return in
Japan helped trigger an unprecedented shift in global resources into the
economies of Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, and Brazil. The doors were open to
such investments thanks to pressure from the United States and others to liber-
alize financial services markets in these emerging markets. In less than a decade,
annual capital flows to developing countries increased six-fold, from about $50
billion to more than $300 billion a year.12
But with easy access to such financial capital, Asia’s private sector rapidly
became over-leveraged, allocating capital carelessly, for example, to speculative
real estate ventures in Thailand or to unneeded industrial capacity in Korea. In
Russia, crony capitalism and rampant corruption exacerbated bad investment
decisions. On top of this, a lack of transparency in corporate and national
accounting and the absence of adequate financial supervision almost every-
where made it almost impossible to know how bad things really were.
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But recent problems are not just the product of greed and mismanagement.
They are also the unintended consequences of major changes in the nature of
modern financial capitalism.
In the 1930s, Willie Sutton said he robbed banks because “that’s where the
money is.” In the 1990s, the money was to be found in the capital markets. The
U.S. mutual fund industry now has greater assets than the banking system.
Worldwide, by the end of 1997, there were $1.5 trillion in international holdings
of bank deposits and $3.5 trillion in international holdings of debt securities, as
borrowers seeking capital turned to the capital markets rather than to banks. 
This securitization of debt offered immense opportunities for rapidly raising
massive amounts of low-cost capital. But it also increased financial instability. In
an environment with virtually no controls on international capital flows, money
that is easier to obtain is also easier to lose. One month foreign investors can
buoy the stock price of a Korean steel maker, fueling extravagant expansion
plans, only to pull the plug on the stock and the company’s future a month later
when investors lose their courage or find a better opportunity half-way around
the world. And capital that doesn’t flee at that moment can be destroyed over
night when the firm’s stock plummets. The fact that this capital has often been
leveraged to unprecedented degrees only amplifies the problem when invest-
ments have to be unwound.
The magnitude of the crisis that began in 1997 and the long-run complexity
of the problems posed by the recent changes in market economies are challenges
the global economy has not faced since the 1930s. At that time, the world was
slow to understand the problem. Few understood the broader economic trans-
formation that was taking place, and no nation wanted to bear the burden of
both resolving the immediate crisis and adapting the global system to the new
economic circumstances. Today, the world faces a similar demand for under-
standing, adaptation, and leadership. Only the United States has the capacity to
lead an effective response.
Restructuring Debt
In the short run, economic growth in Europe, Japan, and the United States
is a necessary precursor for resolving the global financial crisis. But it is not suf-
ficient. Somehow the crushing burden of emerging market financial obligations
must be restructured, as President Clinton first proposed in his September 1998
speech to the Council on Foreign Relations.  
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This will require burden sharing by creditors through debt-for-equity
swaps, lower interest rates, a stretching out of repayment schedules, and even
debt forgiveness. The large number of private sector debtors and creditors will
make this much more difficult than the workout of Latin American debt in the
1980s, when the debtors were a dozen national governments and the principal
creditors a relatively small number of international banks. The problems
encountered in obtaining agreement among Korea’s creditors in December 1997
are a foretaste of the difficulties that can be anticipated in getting diverse credi-
tors to agree on a general restructuring plan. Furthermore, most of the Latin
American debt was owed to U.S. commercial banks, giving the U.S. government
great leverage in persuading those institutions to write down their loans. Today,
only 10 percent of Asian debt is owed to U.S. banks, while half is owed to
European banks and two-fifths to Japanese banks. 
German and French banks, already under pressure thanks to domestic com-
petition in the financial sector generated by monetary union, have expressed no
interest in debt restructuring. And bankrupt Japanese banks have little room for
maneuver. If the growth-sapping weight of emerging market debt is to be allevi-
ated, the United States may have to find ways to leverage European and
Japanese participation. The first step may be to ensure that the G-7 group of
industrial nations commits itself to significant debt restructuring. After the Latin
American experience in the 1980s and the Asian experience in the 1990s, the G-7
nations may need to accept that periodic debt restructurings are inevitable—not
unlike bankruptcy in domestic economies—and develop a formal procedure for
triggering debt restructuring when conditions warrant. At the very least, the G-7
may want to insist that new emerging market bond contracts do away with con-
sensus decision making by creditors, so that decisions on restructuring debt
payments could be determined by the majority of creditors.  
But alleviating debt is only a palliative for the immediate problem. The cri-
sis has underscored the need to adapt the global financial system to the chang-
ing nature of the world economy. As the principal architect of the current sys-
tem, its greatest beneficiary, its leading funder, and its de facto leader, only the
United States can lead this reform.
Managing Capital Controls
Extreme volatility of capital flows distinguished the 1997-1998 crisis. In 
1997, billions of dollars fled the Indonesian economy, destabilizing the currency. 
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In the fall of 1998, Brazil’s foreign reserves shrank at the rate of several hundred
million dollars a day. And in early October 1998, so much capital moved into
Japan, as hedge funds unwound their positions, that the value of the yen
jumped by 20 percent in a matter of days. 
Capital shifts of this magnitude are more than financial market corrections;
they can have a disastrous impact on the real economy. For this reason, at the
IMF’s 1998 annual meeting there was a general consensus, not necessarily
shared by the U.S. government, that some form of capital controls was
inevitable in some circumstances.
Chile has long had restrictions on the inward flow of investment and its
controls are thought to have shielded it from much of the 1997-1998 Asian eco-
nomic flu. In 1998, Malaysia imposed controls on taking investment out of the
country, to insulate itself from the activities of hedge funds and other specula-
tion. And China’s capital controls helped it to successfully avoid much of the
turmoil associated with the Asian crisis.  
But capital controls are no panacea. They tend to distort the allocation of
capital and reduce the efficiency of investment. Furthermore, with unrecorded
capital flows from emerging markets totaling nearly $64 billion in 1997, govern-
ment curbs are likely to be ineffective. And closing the barn door after the horse
has fled only ensures that the horse may not return. When investors can put
their money in markets with unfettered capital mobility, they are unlikely to
choose a nation that limits that flexibility. Moreover, even Chile’s widely herald-
ed controls had their drawbacks. The curbs effectively limited short-term
Chilean bank exposure in dollar-denominated assets, but they crippled the
Chilean equity market, hurting small and medium-sized Chilean companies that
could not go abroad to raise capital.13
Because it has so much to lose if the world gets capital controls wrong, the
United States must be at the center of any effort to manage capital flows in the
future. As the world’s largest debtor, required to import capital to service its
international obligations, the United States would pay a stiff price if such bor-
rowing were inhibited. With an aging population, America’s pension funds will
need the higher returns they can get over the long term in emerging markets
and the freedom to allocate those investments to maximize returns. And as the
world’s largest exporter of goods and services, the United States must be mind-
ful of the experience of the 1960s and 1970s, when capital controls and limits on
trade went hand-in-hand. 
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Strengthening Financial Systems
Rather than play defense in the spreading international debate over capital
controls, the United States should be proactive. We should change the discus-
sion from a fight over re-imposing capital controls on countries that now enjoy
free capital movement to an effort to deal with the shortcomings of the interna-
tional financial system.
The activities of Long Term Capital Management and other speculative
investors have greatly weakened the moral position of the U.S. government in
challenging the movement toward capital controls. But Washington does have
some capacity to steer the debate to the more useful ground of limits on bank
exposure to highly-leveraged financial activities. Controls on hedge funds them-
selves would be useless; they would simply move their activities offshore. But
international limits on banks’ ability to imprudently lend money to hedge funds
without setting aside adequate reserves may be effective in avoiding a repeat of
massive, hedge fund-driven capital flows. 
The banking systems of many emerging markets, and even some industrial
nations, are inefficient, corrupt, and inadequate for competition in the multi-tril-
lion dollar global capital market. If it was the weakness of the banks in Thailand
and Japan that helped precipitate the current crisis, the enormous debt and
backwardness of the Chinese banking system could precipitate the next one.
This problem is not new. Since 1980, three-quarters of the member countries
of the IMF have experienced at least one significant banking sector problem.
Resolving those problems cost more than a quarter of a trillion dollars and
untold billions in lost economic growth, and such banking crises are now occur-
ring with increasing frequency.14
To avoid similar problems in the future, the United States should press for a
minimum set of international banking standards that would include:
• timely publication of accurate information that conforms to international 
accounting standards and has been confirmed by independent auditors,
• common loan classification and provisioning practices,
• tougher reserve requirements and prudential lending controls,
• disclosure of government ownership and lending to parties with close 
connections to the bank and its officers. 
Such new standards should not apply only to the financial sector. There is a
need for parallel reforms of corporate governance by borrowers such as inde-
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pendent boards of directors, the use of internationally recognized accounting
practices, and more uniform bankruptcy standards. Shared norms for corporate
governance would limit reckless borrowing and force corporations to be more
accountable to their shareholders and creditors. And they would force compa-
nies to make decisions based on profitability and return on investment, avoiding
many of the recent problems created by borrowing that only created production
overcapacity.
Overcoming the Liquidity Crunch
Our most recent global troubles have reflected, in part, a shortage of liquidi-
ty. Just as too much money led to the excesses that caused the crisis, too little
money will make it difficult for beleaguered nations to recover. Net capital flows
to developing countries will fall from $311 billion in 1996 to $185 billion in 1999,
according to the Institute of International Finance. In part, this decline reflects a
collapse of bank lending, which will fall from a peak of $113.3 billion to an esti-
mated $11.9 billion during this period. Without sufficient capital, it will be diffi-
cult for emerging market nations to raise domestic demand to revive economic
growth.15 Currently, in mid-1999, capital is beginning to trickle back to emerging
markets. However, the last thing the world needs is a return to unrestrained
bank lending and reckless investment. To avoid a recurrence of those problems,
the first step toward sustainable private capital flows must be greater trans-
parency in financial transactions that will enable investors and lenders to dis-
criminate between good and bad risks. Governments also should clearly define
the limitations of their role in future bailouts, so that private lenders are fully
aware of the risks they take. 
More broadly, just as national economies have a lender of last resort, the
global economy needs a financial backstop. But the price is steep. As of
September 1998 just three crisis countries—Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand—
had borrowed $118 billion from the international financial institutions, Europe,
Japan, and the United States to shore up their economies. More resources are
therefore needed. Congress’ long overdue approval of an $18 billion U.S. contri-
bution to a general IMF capital increase in October 1998 triggered contributions
from other nations, alleviating the IMF’s immediate capital constraints. But
much of that money is not usable. Some must be kept in reserve to meet poten-
tial demands by member countries that have first call on their contributions.
Some is denominated in developing country currencies that would not prove
helpful in a crisis. The remaining available funds could rapidly be exhausted if 
12
new problems arise in Latin America or if new speculative attacks hit Indonesia,
Korea, and Thailand. 
In 1997, IMF managing director Michel Camdessus said the Fund would
need $160 billion in additional money over and above the $90 billion in the cur-
rent replenishment. That estimate now seems on the low side, as proposals to
use IMF funds in new and different ways continue to proliferate. At its October
1998 meeting, the IMF Interim Committee endorsed “lending into arrears”—
making new loans to countries that have not kept up their payments on past
debts. (This change was necessary to allow more lending to Russia.) President
Clinton raised the price tag even further with his open-ended proposal for a
new international lending facility that vulnerable emerging market economies
that followed appropriate policies could tap before they get in trouble. Brazil
was the first test case of this approach, at an initial cost of $30 billion. In addi-
tion, the World Bank, which has lent billions of dollars to provide a social safety
net for the newly poor in Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand, may need additional
funds to fulfill those obligations, at a price tag estimated to be about $20 billion.
The difficulty in obtaining Congressional approval for the most recent IMF
funding and the daunting prospect of asking industrial country taxpayers dur-
ing a period of slowing economic growth to further increase their contributions
to the international financial institutions suggest that some other method of
increasing multilateral lending capacity must be found. 
The IMF could follow the highly successful example of the World Bank and
borrow in commercial bond markets. But member governments might object
that such a move would make the IMF less politically accountable to leading
member nations. The IMF could tap Europe, Japan, or China for more funds, but
the United States might object to losing influence if it no longer was the largest
funder. Years ago Nobel Prize-winning economist James Tobin proposed a small
tax on international capital flows. This would generate billions of dollars in rev-
enue that could be kept in reserve for future bailouts. Or the private sector
could be tapped for new money, with IMF guarantees that it will be paid back.
But the price of that course might be the loss of leverage to reform misguided
government policies in emerging markets.
Whatever the source, a modern global economy needs deep pockets backing
it up—if not for this crisis, then for the next one.
Institutionalizing Reform
The problems in Asia, Latin America, and Russia have also highlighted the
shortcomings of the international financial institutions themselves. The Bretton
13
Woods institutions—the IMF and the World Bank—are more than a half century
old. They were built to operate in a world of fixed exchange rates and capital
controls. Faced with the current crisis, their bureaucratic rigidities, staff inade-
quacies, and the frequently inflexible orthodoxy of their policy prescriptions
have been criticized for often making bad situations worse. Nevertheless, the
crisis also demonstrated that no other institutions are capable of playing their
role; if the international financial institutions did not exist, they would have to
be invented. 
The failings of the Bank and Fund have led some critics, such as former U.S.
Secretary of State George Shultz, to advocate the abolition of the IMF. Others
have called for radical surgery on the Bretton Woods institutions, including a
partial merger of the IMF and the World Bank, joint decision making on some
issues, and a general realignment of functions.
The United States initially urged delaying such architectural reform, argu-
ing that it would be counterproductive to spend time restructuring the fire
department while it is busy putting out fires. Nevertheless, the IMF replenish-
ment approved by Congress demanded more stringent IMF lending practices,
and the G-7 is exploring reforms. But the easing of the global financial crisis by
mid-1999 threatens to ease the pressure for reform. That would be a dangerous
outcome, because problems inherent in the international financial institutions
that were surfaced by the crisis would then remain unresolved.
The lines of responsibility between the IMF (created to help countries deal
with balance of payments crises) —and the World Bank (set up to fund develop-
ment) have blurred. The Bank has inexorably been drawn into crisis manage-
ment, and the Fund into dealing with structural issues. A sorting out of respon-
sibilities is long overdue.
There is also a general consensus that countries working with the Bank and
Fund must be willing to publish timely economic data, that the institutions must
be willing to share their country advice with the markets, and that decision
making within the institutions must be open to public scrutiny. Some of this has
already begun, but more transparency is needed. 
Moreover, there should be closer coordination of activities among all of the
other major multilateral institutions responsible for the global economy. For
example, the World Trade Organization was not at the table when the initial
adjustment programs were negotiated with Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia. Yet




Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the world was plagued with vast current
account imbalances. In the 1980s, the United States ran up a record current
account deficit with the world, both in nominal terms and in relation to GDP,
saw that deficit shrink, and then watched it run up to another record in the late
1990s. Conversely, Japan ran a record surplus, saw it ebb, and then again
explode.
In and of themselves, there is nothing necessarily wrong with such imbal-
ances. As the richest economies in the world, the United States can certainly
afford to service its current account deficit and Japan to recycle its surplus. But
the imbalances suggest deeper structural problems, create economic vulnerabili-
ties, and pose recurrent political problems.
International imbalances simply reflect the difference between the amount a
country saves and the amount it invests. The U.S. deficit underscores the fact
that Americans save too little—at less than half the German rate and less than a
quarter the Japanese. Such profligacy is unlikely to be sustainable in perpetuity.
At some point the world may find better uses for its cash than to lend it to the
United States. Japan, for example, will eventually have to stop exporting its sur-
plus and call it home to take care of its rapidly aging population. Moreover, the
need to service its mounting international debt makes the American economy
increasingly vulnerable to even minor changes in international capital flows, as
Washington’s policy flexibility is constrained by the anticipated reaction of inter-
national capital markets to American policies. Finally, persistent deficits can
adversely affect key industries and their workers, thereby reinforcing the
impression of unfairness that undermines public support for an open economy
and fanning protectionist sentiments. 
In managing the current imbalances, the United States faces a particular
problem. In the short run, if the nations of Asia are to grow their way out of
their current recessions, they must jump-start their economies through exports.
If they are to succeed, the United States will need to run large trade deficits with
them for some time. But experience in the 1980s suggests that when the U.S.
merchandise trade deficit rises to 3-4 percent of GDP, protectionist pressures can
explode. In 1999 the merchandise imbalance is likely to reach that range, at
about $300 billion. Such a prospect lends even greater urgency to market-based
reforms in emerging market economies to ensure that they make a rapid transi-
tion to domestic-led growth.
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